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2006-02-16
“The Gallery of Opinions”, “The Gallery of Knowledge” and “The Gallery of Dresden”: A Phenomenological Reading of Hegel’s Concept of History of Philosophy
TAG:Hegel time-space ke 柯小刚

“The Gallery of Opinions”, “The Gallery of Knowledge” and “The Gallery of Dresden”: A Phenomenological Reading of Hegel’s Concept of History of Philosophy


Ke Xiaogang

(Associate Professor of Philosophy Department, Tongji University, 200092 Shanghai, China)

Abstract: From a phenomenological perspective of game-space and horizon, this paper tries to make a deconstructive reading of Hegel’s “two galleries”, namely “the gallery of opinions” and “the gallery of knowledge”, which are mentioned in the introduction of Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy. The reading shows that the Game-space or the ab-gruendiger Grund of the Hegelian concept of philosophical history lies in an originally differencing space that is keeping in absence, which is called by Husserl and Derrida “the gallery of Dresden”.

Keywords: History of Philosophy, Game-space, Middle-point, Circle, taking-place, between-space

Introduction

It is in the philosophy of Hegel that the history of western philosophy has completed itself as a very grand system for the first time. In the space of Hegelian history of philosophy, every moment is tightly connected with the next one. From one philosopher to the next, from the Orient to the Occident, the tightness of historical-geographical link is as stark as the logic chain. In fact, for Hegel, logic is the very principle of history. Only from the determination of the logic, namely from the immanent principle and unfolding of logic, history could then become itself, in which various philosophies could then be articulated as one grand chain-system. However, according to Hegelian dialectic of history, this grand chain-system does not take a lineal structure or a simple circle. Rather, it consists of a series of aspiring circles. In the “middle point” of every circle on every stage or in every moment there is the always-present “absolute spirit”, around which there are generations of philosophers, including those ancient Chinese thinkers who are placed before the “true beginning” of philosophy and thus are outside of the chain of western “proper” philosophers.

This grand system of circles provides a space of meaning, in which any philosophy could be associated meaningfully with all of the other philosophies once it is put in the space. However, we must bear in mind that in this space of meaning the relation between any two philosophies must be mediated through the “middle point”. That is to say, any philosophy must at first be “placed” by the Spirit, then could he “take place” in the space of the circle. Therefore, we can say that in the space of Hegelian historical circle, the spatiality of the space is not understood as the primordial, on the contrary, it is derived from the punctuality of the “middle point” or the absolute spirit. In the space that derived from the punctuality, the dispositif of mediation determine everything. In the absolute operation of mediation, the primordial Gegend of difference between any two philosophies has been leveled off. That is to say, in the Hegelian history of philosophy, any “betweenness” of any two philosophies has been fulfilled with Spirit the absolute mediator, therefore, there is no place between any two philosophies at all. Hegel has not investigated (er-örtert) the place (Ort) of the betweenness (das Zwischen) at all. Comparatively, in Heidegger’s phenomenology-hermeneutics, investigated (er-örtert) always means a locating of a place (Ort). For instance, at the beginning of his paper “Language in poems”, Heidegger says: “Erörtern meint hier zunächst: in den Ort weisen.” [1](Investigation means here at first: to the place indicate.)

Therefore, we must at first try to deconstruct Hegel’s concept of history of philosophy, in order to enter a “free openness” or “game-place” (Spielraum), in which we could then confront with a philosopher in the history and develop a “loving polemics”(der liebende Streit)with him. Only after such steps, according to Heidegger, that we could show a “new gesture of facing history”.[2] However, the work of deconstructing the Hegelian concept of history of philosophy from phenomenological perspective is far from something new. Many phenomenologists after Heidegger, such as Eugen Fink, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Otto Pöggeler, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, and John Sallis, have made their contributions in their respective reading of Hegel. Although their readings are different to each other, one can easily draw a common interest of phenomenological method from all of their works.

As to our investigation here, we will not intent to introduce and summarize those reading works done by the predecessors. Rather, we will try to question: fundamentally speaking, for any phenomenological reading of Hegel, how is the space of history that it try to show us? And seeing from the perspective of this space, in what space does Hegel’s concept of philosophical history play? Furthermore, how does the former space lay a foundation for the latter one?

Why do we take the question of spatiality as our focus of reading? Because the questioning of the different game-spaces of the concept is the crucial step of any phenomenological deconstruction of philosophical history. From Heidegger’s reading of the “essential space” out of the Hegelian δια[3] to John Sallis’s reading of “spacing” in Hegel[4], the problem of space played an important role in some phenomenological-hermeneutical deconstructions of Hegel’s concept of history of philosophy. Therefore, in the following analysis, we will try to begin with a deconstructional reading on the spatiality of the two “galleries” Hegel mentioned in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, in the course of which we will try to show the spatiality of the phenomenological “gallery of Dresden” that Husserl and Derrida have discussed. At last, we will return to Hegel and try to locate the place and show the game-space of the Hegelian concept of history of philosophy from the perspective of the “Dresden Gallery”.

Hegel’s Two Galleries: “The Gallery of Opinions” and “The Gallery of Knowledge”

The “Introduction” of Lectures on the History of Philosophy is a concentrate expression of the Hegelian concept of history of philosophy. In the opening two sentences, Hegel has pointed out the most crucial point in his concept of history of philosophy, namely, the “middle-point” or the “wesentlicher Zusammenhang”:

Über das Interesse dieser Geschichte können der Betrachtung vielerlei Seiten beigehen. Wenn wir es in seinem Mittelpunkt erfassen wollen, so haben wir ihn in dem wesentlichen Zusammenhang dieser scheinbaren Vergangenheit zu suchen mit der gegenwärtigen Stufe, welche die Philosophie erreicht hat.[5]

According to the mentioned quotation, in order to find the “middle-point” of the history, we must “go down” to the concrete historical connections. However, this initial interest, and at the same time the last end, of searching for the “middle-point” has determined in advance, what we find out in the history could only be the “essential connections”. The existence of the “middle-point” is one of the essential characters of Hegel’s historical space of philosophy. It determines the fundamental structure of that space as the circles that unfolding itself around the “middle-point”. In this circular space, the looking-for of the “middle-point” determines not only the necessity of the historical research but also the way of it. Or to put the same meaning in another way, we can say, before the concrete research on history, a Hegelian historical researcher has known, from the determination of the “middle-point”, the form of the philosophical history that he will enter into. The interest of the “middle-point” determines the being and essence of the history. The so-called identity of philosophy and history, or the proposition that philosophy is the history of philosophy, means in Hegel that there is only one proper philosophy (die Philosophy) and one proper history of philosophy. Such expressions as “Diese scheinbare Vergangenheit”, “die gegenwärtige Stufe, welche die Philosophie erreicht hat”, indicate that time, history and multiplicity are only the phenomenological, unessential things.

Only from the mentioned point that we can understand the first sentence of the “Introduction”: “Über das Interesse dieser Geschichte können der Betrachtung vielerlei Seiten beigehen.” What is plural here is only the aspects of the investigation instead of the investigation itself. Only the plurality of the aspects or the perspectives is permitted. As to the proper history, philosophy, truth and thought, none of them could be plural. In the following paragraphs, this plurality of the perspectives have been related again to the “seemly passed history of philosophy”, and therefore been explained as a narrative of the Platonic doxas. From the position of “the usual and superficial idea of philosophy history”, “the history of philosophy is only a gallery of opinions.” This gallery is a gallery of fools and errors:

Somit stoßen wir denn sogleich auf die sehr gewöhnliche Ansicht von der Geschichte der Philosophie, daß sie nämlich den Vorrat von philosophischen Meinungen herzuerzählen habe, wie sie sich in der Zeit ergeben und dargestellt haben. Wenn glimpflich gesprochen wird, so heißt man diesen Stoff Meinungen; die es mit gründlicherem Urteile ausdrücken zu können glauben, nennen diese Geschichte eine Galerie der Narrheiten sogar oder wenigstens der Verirrungen des sich ins Denken und in die bloßen Begriffe vertiefenden Menschen.[6]

This paragraph is under the subtitle of “the usual attitude to the history of philosophy”. Seeing from the concept of philosophy history, Hegel sees a gallery of opinions in the usual idea of history of philosophy. This gallery is the gallery of fools and of errors. However, just before pages in the introduction, in the beginning sentence of the second paragraph, we have read that Hegel takes the history of philosophy as “the gallery of the heroes of the thinking reason”:

Was die Geschichte der Philosophie uns darstellt, ist die Reihe der edlen Geister, die Galerie der Heroen der denkenden Vernunft, welche kraft dieser Vernunft in das Wesen der Dinge, der Natur und des Geistes, in das Wesen Gottes eingedrungen sind und uns den höchsten Schatz, den Schatz der Vernunfterkenntnis erarbeited haben.[7]

This time, for the “Gallery of heros”, it is called “die Galerie” (the gallery), while for the “gallery of opinion”, it is called “eine Galerie” (a gallery). That is to say, once seen from the Reason, the gallery of history should be “capitalized” as the Gallery. In addition, we should have also noticed another special expression: “die denkenden Vernunft” (the thinking Reason), instead of “the thinking thinkers” or “the reason of the thinkers”. This special Hegelian expression implies that the subject of thinking is the cogito without a body. Hegel has mentioned this idea clearly in the following sentence: “Die Begebenheiten und Handlungen dieser Geschichte [of philosophy] sind deswegen zugleich von der Art, daß in deren Inhalt und Gehalt nicht sowohl die Persönlichkeit und der individuelle Charakter eingeht.”[8]

We have read two galleries in Hegel’s painting of the history of philosophy. One is the gallery of opinions, fools and errors; and the other is that of the heroes of Reason (Vernunft) and Knowledge (Wissenschaft). The scenes of the two galleries are different to each other but also relate deeply to each other. The exposing and comparison of the pictures of the two galleries, and even the constitution of the spectators’ perspectives and the gestures of the painting hands, will help us to find what on earth is the “essential connection” that Hegel has found out in the history of philosophy: how has it been found, and how does it relates?

We have found also a seemly unimportant order: “die Galerie” is mentioned before “eine Galerie”. This implies that the former is more immediate. It seems that reflection or Nach-denken is a thinking that comes after, but in fact it goes in advance, because it is itself that makes it possible to put itself on the backward position. The self-recognizing thinking or self-consciousness is not any more the simple thinking or self-consciousness, but Spirit. When a researcher without any idea of philosophy history – Hegel sees rightly that this is unimaginable – faces the multiplicity of the historical materials, what will he see? A gallery? If yes, will it be a gallery of foolish opinions or the gallery of the rational heroes? If he could see a gallery, it must be one of the two. But if he “has not any idea of the philosophy history”, he will see nothing, neither of the two galleries. This implies, any mythos of a pure or immediate immediateness must be eliminated. According to Hegel, everything has been mediated, including the immediate is also the immediate that “returns” after mediation. There is no completely original immediateness. There is no original originality that does not appear as a result. The searching for the pure originality is considered by Hegel as the metaphysical interest, and any thinking departing from this pure originality is taken as arbitral metaphysics. Therefore, from the Hegelian position that tries to aufheben the metaphysical immediate thinking, the gallery of the history of philosophy will appear neither purely as a gallery of foolish opinions, nor purely as the gallery of the knowledge heroes, but rather a round or circular gallery, which is the mediated result of the inter-negation and inter-constitution of the two galleries.

Therefore, the difference between the scenes of the two galleries will be not so clear. The two are not incommunicable. Why is it possible to transform from one scene to the other one? Why is it possible to change from opinions to knowledge, from “the usual attitude to philosophy history” to “the concept of philosophy history”? Hegel will answer: it is Bildung (education) that makes them possible. Bildung is drawing or painting, to paint a gallery of rational knowledge. But this course of Bildung meets no ending, for opinions always mixture with knowledge and makes the gallery of knowledge can not be purified, can not exclude counterfeit works from the gallery of opinions. Therefore, contrary to the ordinary opinion, the Hegelian history has no end.

No end, this means at the same time there is also no beginning. “What should be the beginning of science?” This Hegelian question has attracted too many attentions. In fact, Hegel has explained immediately after that question that “to speak of a beginning of philosophy has a meaning only in relation to a person who proposes to commence the study, and not in relation to the science as science.”[9] Then, what is “the science as science” or the philosophy? In the same paragraph, Hegel used a famous metaphor to definite it: philosophy itself is “ein in sich zurückgehender Kreis.”[10] The self-returning circle is just the space inter-constituted by the two galleries.

“The Gallery of Dresden”: The Game-Space of the Taking-Place of the History of Philosophy

The returned immediate after mediation consists the beginning of the Hegelian circular movement of dialectics. Starting from this beginning as an “immanent origin”, Hegel sees at first a gallery of opinions. At the same time, he sees that the essence of the gallery of opinions is the gallery of knowledge. The course from the gallery of opinions to the gallery of knowledge is the course of the Bildung of the rational subject, and even the course of the self-recognizing of the absolute spirit. We have discussed these Hegelian ideas within the game-space of the Hegelian thought. Now, if we get out of this space of the circular movement, and try to view the problem “from outside”, or from the viewpoint of Derrida’s “supplement of the origin”[11], what will we find out? Through a comparative study between writing script and phonetic language, Derrida finds out in the writing script something like a topological structure between the inner and the outer. According to this experience, Derrida points out that the supplement of the origin, which is the absolute outer origin, will supplement and replace the origin. As to his special terminology “supplement”, Derrida explained, “Or c’est bien l’essence étrange du supplement que de n’avoir pas d’essentialité : il peut toujours n’avoir pas lieu. A la lettre, il n’a d’ailleurs jamais lieu : il n’est jamais présent, ici, maintenant. S’il l’était, il ne serait pas ce qu’il est, un supplément, tenant le lieu et maintenant la place de l’autre....n’a donc surtout pas lieu. Moins que rien et pourtant, à en juger par ses effets, beaucoup plus que rien. Le supplément n’est ni une présence ni une absence. Aucune ontologie ne peut en penser l’opération.”[12]

“Observing” the “gallery of the history of philosophy” from the viewpoint of the “supplement of the origin”, we must question the Hegelian circular gallery that is inter-constituted by the immediate-mediate and the beginning-result: in which space, place or horizon is this circular movement possible? Through this questioning, we touches the primordial game-space in which the history of philosophy “takes place”. If it is not “taking-place” in that game-space, how could the two galleries, namely the gallery of opinions and that of knowledge, constitute their respective scene? Hegel may answer: through the inter-negation and inter-constitution of the two galleries. But, at first, from where comes the betweenness between negation and constitution? From the Selbst-Entzweiung of the absolute spirit? Or on the contrary, is it only from this between-space that makes the dialectic game of the self-dividing-returning of the absolute possible? And also makes the game of the Betrachtung of the inter-negation-constitution of the two galleries possible?

Therefore, if we are still ignorant to the primordial game-space in which the history of philosophy “takes place”, we will still be unable to “see” the “gallery of the history of philosophy” clearly, even if we rely on the dialectic of inter-negation-constitution to aufheben the opposition of the two galleries into a circular gallery. Or, maybe for the history of philosophy, it is not a gallery in any sense at all, and the appropriate way of studying it should not be any sense of “seeing”.

Now, with the questioning of the game-space or the “taking-place” of the history of philosophy in mind, let us read again the first sentence, too simple a sentence, of the “Introduction” of Hegel’s Vorlesungen:

Über das Interesse dieser Geschichte können der Betrachtung vielerlei Seiten beigehen.

It sounds empty, banal, unimportant. As if it is only a casual, transitional “opening remark” or “prologue” that goes through the motions. Sure, it is an opening prologue that intends to bring out or introduce the second sentence, which is in fact the “middle-point” of the whole “Introduction”:

Wenn wir es in seinem Mittelpunkt erfassen wollen, so haben wir ihn in dem wesentlichen Zusammenhang dieser scheinbaren Vergangenheit zu suchen mit der gegenwärtigen Stufe, welche die Philosophie erreicht hat.

If the second sentence is surely the “middle-point” or the central sentence of the whole “Introduction” or even of the whole Lectures, then the first sentence should really be a “opening remark” or “prologue”: the introduction of the “Introduction”. This little fact has always been neglected: the “Introduction” begins with this seemingly empty, unimportant sentence. Hegel does not talk about the “middle-point” and the “essential connection” at the very beginning. This situation is just like in the Logic: “changing” is “the first concept”, but the Logic must begin with “being” and “nothingness”. “Material” is the “first true category of the reality” in the Philosophy of Nature, but the Philosophy of Nature must begin with “space” and “time”. The “true beginning” of philosophy lies in Greece, more exactly speaking in the Parmenidesian “being”, but the history of philosophy must begin with “China” and “India”, the so-called “China” and “India”.

The most possible misunderstanding to the first sentence of the “Introduction” maybe lies in the understanding that takes it as the opposition of the second sentence. According to this misunderstanding, the first sentence shows us the gallery of opinions. It seems that Hegel demonstrates us a “vulgar scene of the philosophical history” or “a gallery of opinions” at the beginning, in order to give a target for critique in advance, and then he could make a turn to say “if we want to grasp the middle-point…” we must try to find the essential connection…and so on.

But the mentioned understanding of Hegel’s words can not answer the following question: If the two galleries or the two kinds of scenes of philosophical history are absolutely different from each other, then how will it possible to criticize and transform one gallery with the other one? Or to put the question on a deeper level: If it is not because of a “empty space” or a horizon in which things can relate to each other and only in this game-space different galleries can inter-constituted each other, then how could any gallery take-place and become itself?

That means, we have read out from the first sentence of Hegel’s “Introduction” the gallery between the two galleries, or the between-space between the two galleries. This between-space or spacing is the primordial horizon in which any gallery has an “ab-ground ground”[13] to take place. This horizon or game-space is absent; It will not present in any case. Therefore, it will not be a gallery at all: It is not anything for being looked at. However, why we still call it a gallery, a between-gallery? Because we see nothing but galleries in it. Or we can say that we will see many galleries in it but this gallery itself – if it does has its “self”. This gallery that conceals itself in the most lightening openness, the gallery that withdraws from the presence of every visible gallery, perhaps can be called a rein Bild or Schema-Bild in Heideggerian terminologies.[14] This “pure picture” or “schema-picture” conceals in or out of the Hegelian system, the grand and shining gallery. We say here “concealing in the outside of the system” or “finding the origin before beginning and after the end”, such phrases are based on a topology of the inner and the outward. This is an idea of origin understood from the position of the Heideggerian time-game-space (Zeit-Spiel-Raum). Time-space or time-game-space has broken the innerness or immanence of the pure time, because “the unfolding of space, the pure externality, in the temporalizing movement of time” has opened the immanence of time, and has been the “opening-door for time to escape itself”.[15] However, this “pure picture” or “schema-picture” has been “seen” by the phenomenological eyes of Husserl and Derrida:

Tout a sans doute commencé ainsi : « Un nom pronocé devant nous nous fait penser à la galerie de Dresde... Nous errons à travers les salles... Un tableau de Téniers... représente une galerie de tableaux... Les tableaux de cette galerie représentent à leur tour des tableaux, qui de leur côté feraient voir des inscriptions qu’on peut déchiffrer, etc. ».[16]

Derrida takes this quotation of the Dresden gallery from Husserl’s Ideen.[17] He also used it as one of the inscriptions for his book La Voix et le Phénomène. Derrida adds such a sentence before the Husserlian quotation: “Tout a sans doute commencé ainsi.” But how does it begin ? It begins like such: In this gallery of Dresden, in which everything takes place, there is neither fixed starting-point nor ending-point. This is what Heidegger calls as the Sachverhalt.[18] It opens a primordial horizon, which provides a game-space for any movement that goes from beginning to the end. Therefore, it is a basis or ground in some sense. However, because it is an “empty space” that never be present, it should be called an “ab-ground ground” as Heidegger calls it in his Contributions to Philosophy.[19]

We quote again “the gallery of Dresden” after Derrida’s quotation. The intention of this re-quotation is to hint, if it is impossible to show, the game-space, in which the Hegelian dialectic game of opinions and knowledge can plays. This hinting or tracing of the game-space will be helpful not only for our understanding of the movement of the Hegelian history of philosophy, but also for the deepening of the phenomenological deconstruction of Hegel.

Seeing Again Hegel’s Two Galleries From the Perspective of “the Gallery of Dresden”

In La Voix et le Phénomène, Derrida has once talked about the “fixed middle-point, an eye or a living core” in Husserl’s phenomenology. This “middle-point”, “eye” or “core”, is present also in the whole Hegelian history of philosophy. For Hegel, it is called the “true thought that is in and for itself, everlasting in all the times.”[20]

This eye is the Betrachtung in the first sentence of the “Introduction”. Being different from the grammar form of Meinungen, what Hegel talks here about is not Betrachtungen, but die Betrachtung: the unique and absolute observation. This observation itself is simple, it can only be conducted from various aspects or perspectives. Only the Seiten can be plural.

The unique and absolute observation observe the history of philosophy from various “sides”, then there could be found out different galleries. If one holds tightly on the “middle-point”, starting from the “essential connection”, then the unique and absolute observation will only see the unique and absolute gallery, namely the gallery of the heroes of the absolute knowledge. If you fail to grasp the “middle-point” and find the “essential connections”, you will fall into the “usual idea of philosophical history” and can only see a gallery of opinions. The latter is what Hegel criticized, while the former is what he tries to develop systematically.

“To develop systematically” means: The plural perspectives of the absolute observation are inter-depending and inter-constitutional. The one and the plural, the immediate and the mediate constitute a circle. The developing of the circles is system.[21] For Hegel, logic and history are inter-supporting and inter-constitutive. Beside this, the Hegelian system needs nothing to be its ground or fundament. Therefore, Hegel considers his philosophical system as the “system of science” (System der Wissenschaft).

However, the Hegelian circle must get its determination from the “middle-point”.[22] This middle-point is the Geist: the absolute, or maybe even the holy, spirit. Facing the Hegelian interpretation of the inter-founded of the logic and history, we must question: Is the identification of the logic and the history immediate? No, it must experience (erfahren) a course of mediation. This always present mediation is the presence of the Geist. Why are history and logic identical? Because history is the history that under the orientation and the motivation of the logos which has become flesh. Therefore, history could only be the history of spirit. It is only because of this point, this middle-point, that history identifies with logic and is rational.

But, on the other hand, the surprising thing is: We have found that in the first sentence of his “Introduction” of the Lectures, Hegel has placed the unique and absolute history that under the mediation of the holy spirit into a situation of possibilities. In other words, it seems that the one and only gallery or the gallery of true knowledge has been debased as one of the possible galleries: It has been the one that can be seen only when you do your observation according to the way required in the second sentence, i.e., to treat history from the position of the middle-point and the essential connection. We remember that the first sentence says: “Über das Interesse dieser Geschichte können der Betrachtung vielerlei Seiten beigehen.” When Hegel says so, no matter he approbate the primordial game-space of difference or not, so long as he must begin with such a sentence in fact, this sentence has revealed: Before the division of the gallery of opinions and that of knowledge, there must at first be a “Dresden gallery”, in which any gallery can take its place to take place. It is in this “Dresden gallery” that the division of the two Hegelian galleries can take place. The former is the “ab-ground ground” or the “game-space” of the latter.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Heidegger, Martin, Unterwegs zur Sprache, Pfullingen: Neske, 1959, p. 37.

[2] Heidegger, Martin, Gesamtausgabe Bd. 28: Der Deutsche Idealismus(Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) und die Philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, pp. 336-337.

[3] See Heidegger, Martin, “Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung”, in Heidegger, Martin, Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 5: Holzwege, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977, pp. 200, 208-209.

[4] See Sallis, John, Spacings of Reason and Imagination in Texts of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987.

[5] Hegel, G. W. F., Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie I, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971, p. 20.

[6] Ibid, p. 29.

[7] Ibid, p. 20.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Hegel, G. W. F., The Logic of Hegel (The Encyclopedic Logic), trans. by William Wallace, Oxford: , p. 28.

[10] Hegel, G. W. F., Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 8: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, hrsg. von Eva Moldenhauer & Karl Markus Michel, p. 63. Wallace translates it as “a circle which closes itself,” not satisfying.

[11] See Derrida, Jacques, De la Grammagologie, Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1967, chapter 4 of part 2. And also Derrida, Jacques, La Voix et le Phénomène, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967, chapter 7.

[12] Derrida, Jacques, De la Grammagologie, Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1967, p. 442.

[13] See Heidegger, Martin, Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 65: Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989, pp. 379-386.

[14] See Heidegger, Martin, Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 3: Kant und das Problem der Mataphysik, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

[15] Derrida, Jacques, La Voix et le Phénomène, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967, pp. 95-97.

[16] Ibid., pp. 116-117.

[17] Husserl, Edmund, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, p. 236.

[18] See Heidegger, Martin, “Zeit und Sein”, in his Zur Sache des Denkens, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1976, p. 4.

[19] See Heidegger, Martin, Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 65: Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, “V. Die Gründung”.

[20] Hegel, G. W. F., Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie I, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971, pp. 23-24, footnote 10.

[21] See Hegel, G. W. F., Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 8: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, § 13-17.

[22] See Ibid, § 261. 
 



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rhizome () 发表于2006-02-16 21:00:17

這個blogbus的程序毛病蠻多:簡介往往不會自己斷行。。英文單詞的Tag無法把比如説Ke Xiaogang作爲一個。。blogcn是用逗號分隔tag,就解決了這個問題。


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